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Abstract: 
 Semiconductor design is one of the many white-collar job categories considered to be at 
risk from offshoring by U.S. companies via investments and outsourcing. Data about this activity 
are scarce and hard to interpret, but there is much to be learned from looking at earlier periods in 
the industry’s history when other phases of the semiconductor value chain – assembly and 
fabrication – experienced rapid offshore expansion. 
 This paper reviews the lessons from these earlier offshore movements of semiconductor 
industry jobs in assembly. Then it analyzes the offshoring of semiconductor fabrication and then 
design; this analysis is based on our ongoing field research combined with trade press reports and 
government data. 
 The experience of assembly and fabrication supports the claim by some that offshoring is 
a reasonable response to the competitive challenges and opportunities facing the semiconductor 
industry, and that the industry will adapt in ways that aren’t necessarily clear from the outset. 
Nevertheless, the outcome of the current offshoring of design provides evidence that some U.S. 
chip design engineers face at least short-term displacement as a result of the industry’s current 
round of globalization. 
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 Semiconductor design is a frequently-cited example of the new wave of offshoring of 
service sector jobs.1 It is certainly a concern to U.S. design engineers themselves.2
 The semiconductor industry already has a rich experience with the offshoring of 
manufacturing activity. Semiconductor (or chip) companies were among the first to invest in 
offshore facilities to manufacture goods for imports back to the U.S. A review of these earlier 
manufacturing experiences and their impact on the fortunes of the domestic industry and its 
workers can help to illuminate the current debates over the offshoring of services. 
 Because meaningful data about the impact of the offshoring of chip design (and even of 
manufacturing) are limited, we rely on a more qualitative analysis for our key points. We have 
conducted dozens of interviews with engineers and managers at numerous semiconductor and 
related companies in the United States, Asia, and Europe over the past twelve years. Our research 
also incorporates the rich store of publicly-available information in trade journals and company 
reports. 
 Before addressing semiconductor design directly, we begin by analyzing the impact on 
the U.S. semiconductor industry of the offshoring of semiconductor assembly and fabrication. We 
argue that the initial concern about losing domestic jobs in both stages turned out to be unfounded 
as the industry used the situation to its competitive advantage by becoming cost competitive 
(through assembly offshoring) and by developing the fabless sector (through foreign outsourcing 
of chip fabrication or manufacturing). We then analyze the ongoing offshoring of design jobs, and 
compare this stage to the two that came before in order to explore the possible impact on 
domestic jobs and the U.S. semiconductor industry.  
 The paper begins in section one with a brief description of the stages of semiconductor 
production and our analytical framework. Section two looks at the offshoring of assembly jobs, 
and section three analyzes the offshoring of manufacturing. Section four explores the offshoring 
of design jobs, and concludes with a discussion of what this means for the U.S. 
 
I. Introduction: The Industry and Analytical Framework 
 In order to understand the offshoring of activities in the semiconductor industry, we begin 
by describing the stages of production.  
 The most important type of semiconductor, and the one on which this study is focused, is 
the integrated circuit, or “chip,” which is basically a network of tiny wires fabricated on a surface 
connecting transistors that switch on and off for processing data in binary code.3 The 
development and manufacturing of chips involve three primary activities in the value chain: 
design, fabrication, test and assembly.  The semiconductor industry has successively undergone 
the offshoring of each of these activities—first assembly, then fabrication, and now design. 
 During design, the desired electronic circuits progress through a series of abstract 
representations of increasing detail. During fabrication, the circuits of the chips are built up on the 
surface of a flat, round silicon wafer in successive layers Assembly is, typically, the process of 
cutting the wafer into individual chips (or die), which can number in the thousands, depending on 
die size, and packaging the delicate chip in a protective shell that includes connections to other 
components.  
 The economic characteristics of each step of the process differ significantly. Design is 
skill intensive, and requires expensive EDA (electronic design automation) software, which is 
typically licensed per design engineer. Fabrication requires a huge fixed investment (currently on 
                                                     
1 See for example “The New Global Job Shift,” Business Week, February 3, 2003, cover story and “Another Lure Of 
Outsourcing: Job Expertise,” Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2004, p.  B1. 
2 “2004 Salary Survey: It's an outsourced world, EEs acknowledge,” EE Times, August 27, 2004. 
3 Other types of semiconductors, such as single transistors or diodes, use different design and manufacturing methods 
not subject to the same economic forces discussed in this paper. These other categories constituted about 15% of the 
total semiconductor market in 2004 (“WSTS Semiconductor Market Forecast,” World Semiconductor Trade Statistics 
press release dated November 2, 2004.). 
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the order of $2 billion) to build a plant (called a fab) that holds a wide variety of expensive 
equipment and that meets extreme requirements of cleanliness. Assembly also requires expensive 
equipment, but the overall costs of plant and equipment are much lower than for the fab, as are 
the average skill requirements. Overall, worker skill requirements go down along the value chain 
(i.e., design is more skill-intensive than manufacturing, which is more skill-intensive than 
assembly). 
 However, equipment costs dominate labor costs, especially for fabrication, and this has 
limited the attractiveness of low-cost labor locations. Even the most labor-intensive activity, chip 
assembly, has become more automated over time. As discussed below, other costs, including 
those relating to land, taxes, and government regulations, often affect decisions to invest offshore. 
 The framework for this analysis of the offshoring of the stages of the industry value chain 
relies on the concept of competitive advantage, which is linked to offshore investing and 
outsourcing, and, ultimately, to domestic jobs.4 A sustained advantage over rivals can be built on 
product (i.e., the intellectual property that defines functionality), price (i.e., the cost of 
production), or market attributes (i.e., new customers, customer service, brand reputation, and 
links to legacy products). These sources of competitive advantage correspond to the three 
principal reasons that firms globalize their activities: access to location-specific resources 
including engineering talent, cost reduction, and market development. 
 When a firm with some non-imitable advantage moves an activity offshore to reduce its 
costs or improve access to resources or markets, it improves (barring cases where the move is 
mismanaged) its competitive position against its rivals. In an expanding market like that for chips, 
the firm will grow and will hire more workers, some of whom will be in the home country and 
some offshore. 
 However, some or all of the workers in the home country who were engaged in the 
activity that shifted offshore may lose their jobs, so that only the remaining home country 
workers benefit from the firm’s move offshore, along with the consumers of the lower-price 
products.5 In addition, exports and imports are increasing with market growth, which clouds the 
impact of offshoring on jobs.6
 In the longer term, numerous firm-level investments in a foreign location may transform 
the location in such a way that it presents a new set of opportunities that lead to a transformation 
of the industry. A foreign location that is initially little more than a source of lower costs, 
especially labor, might develop over time as a specialized supply base, particularly in the 
presence of incentives and infrastructure provided by the host country government. The changes 
can increase the value of the location to the point that the industry eventually restructures around 
the new distribution of skills such that offshoring becomes the preferred mode for this part of the 
value chain. It will be discussed below how this occurred for semiconductor assembly, but it has 
also taken place in other industries, such as hard disk drives.7
 In other words, the pursuit of offshoring to gain competitive advantage in the context of a 
growing market initiated a dynamic process that has made the net employment effect difficult to 
estimate even after the fact. Table 1 summarizes our analysis of the three segments of the 
semiconductor value chain that is presented in the following sections of the paper. 
                                                     
4 Porter (1985). 
5 See, for example, Garner (2004) for further discussion. 
6 Groshen, Hobijn, and McConnell (2005). 
7 McKendrick, Doner, and Haggard (2000). 
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Table 1: Summary of Facts and Findings by Industry Segment 
 Value chain 
segment 
Assembly Fabrication Design 
Share of 
engineers in 
workforce of 
the segment 
 
6% 
 
24% 
 
85% 
 
Key economic 
characteristics 
Moderately capital-
intensive; requires access 
to low-cost direct labor 
Highly capital-
intensive; requires 
access to infrastructure 
and experienced process 
engineers 
Highly skill-intensive; 
requires access to 
experienced designers 
and end users 
U.S. 
experience 
with offshore 
investments 
Shifted to developing 
countries beginning in 
1960s 
Cross-investments with 
other developed 
countries beginning in 
1970s 
Offshore investments 
to both high- and low-
wage countries 
beginning in the 1980s
 
Impact on the 
U.S. industry 
Offshoring helped U.S. 
firms respond to the initial 
Asian competitive threat at 
cost of “hollowing out” the 
domestic assembly sector 
Offshoring by U.S. 
firms has been largely 
offset by foreign 
investments in the U.S. 
Offshoring has 
entered a period of 
expansion while 
domestic employment 
was flat during the 
period of slow growth. 
US experience 
with foreign 
outsourcing 
Asian outsourcing started 
in late 1960s 
Asian outsourcing 
started in mid-1980s 
Asian outsourcing 
started in the 1990s 
 
Impact on the 
U.S. industry 
Outsourcing helps U.S. 
firms reduce their 
investment in capacity and 
in the variety of chip 
packages. 
Outsourcing stimulated 
the emergence of a 
“fabless” chip sector 
and helps fab-owning 
firms reduce their risk 
of overcapacity. 
Long-term result 
uncertain. May have 
curbed domestic 
hiring but allows start-
ups to compete. 
SOURCE: Points from the text 
 
II. Assembly: from in-house offshoring to offshored outsourcing 
 Assembly was the easiest stage of production to move offshore. It was functionally 
separate from the other stages of production even when performed in close proximity to 
fabrication. Furthermore, assembly began with a relatively high use of less-skilled direct labor, 
making it an attractive target for cost-reduction offshoring. 
 During the 1980s, the U.S. offshore chip assembly subsidiaries switched to automation in 
response to a combination of increasingly intricate packaging requirements beyond the skills of 
manual labor along with rising wages in some South-East Asian nations. A typical chip assembly 
plant employs 1,000 or more workers. As of the mid-1990s, low-skilled workers made up about 
80% of the staff of offshore assembly plants. The share of engineering and professional jobs was 
about 6%, and technicians made up another 13%.8
                                                     
8 The Advanced Micro Devices chip assembly subsidiary in Penang, Malaysia employed 160 engineers and 380 
technicians out of 2,900 workers (“Firm to make new microchips,” The Star, May 25, 1996). This ratio is similar to that 
for the whole semiconductor-dominated Malaysian-American Electronic Industry group in 1994 as reported in their 
Annual Survey of 17 members over the preceding five years (MAEI, 1995). 
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 The move to offshore assembly led to a “hollowing out” of the U.S. chip assembly sector, 
but kept the U.S. chip industry cost-competitive as new rivals appeared in Europe and Japan. 
Over time, Asian suppliers appeared and are taking over a growing portion of the assembly 
business, so it went from in-house offshoring to offshored outsourcing. Most large chip 
companies still own assembly plants in Asia. 
 The main lesson from this period of offshoring is that giving up one part of the value 
chain (at least as far as domestic production is concerned) may help to “save” the domestic 
industry.9 The second lesson is that the initial moves offshore can have unforeseen dynamic 
consequences such as the emergence of foreign suppliers who dominate the industry segment. 
A. Offshoring, job loss, and competition 
 Because of their high value-to-weight ratio, semiconductors could profitably be 
fabricated in the United States, air-freighted to Asia for assembly, and then returned to the United 
States for final testing and shipment to the customer. This system allowed the U.S. companies to 
take advantage of the specialized skilled and semi-skilled labor in the United States for design, 
fabrication, and key managerial functions while tapping the lower cost unskilled labor, land, and 
taxes of Asia for assembly. Today, the trans-oceanic division of labor between fabrication and 
assembly still takes place. Final testing was added to Asian assembly plants in the 1980s, which 
allows the finished chips to be shipped directly to customers from Asia, which is where a large 
share of the market is also located. From 1984 to 2004, the share of semiconductor sales in Asia, 
including Japan, has risen from 38 to 63% of the world total.10
 The earliest offshore investment in semiconductor assembly was made in 1961 by 
Fairchild Semiconductor in Hong Kong for the assembly of discrete transistors. Over the next 
fifteen years, this pioneering investment was followed by assembly investments by other 
companies in seven other economies of the region. By the mid-1970s, there were dozens of U.S.-
owned assembly plants throughout the region employing about 1,000 workers each.11
 Developing economies in the Western hemisphere such as Mexico and El Salvador 
received assembly investments, but during the 1970s gradually receded from one-quarter to one-
tenth of U.S. re-imports in the face of political or social unrest, while East Asia made up the 
difference.12 The Asian countries offered plentiful low-skilled workers and stable governments 
that adopted pro-investment policies. 
 All large U.S. “merchant” (selling to other companies) chip firms invested in offshore 
assembly. The two primary “captive” (for internal use) producers, IBM and AT&T, initially kept 
their assembly in the United States and adopted a higher level of automation than the offshore 
plants.13 For at least one U.S. company, Philco, an attempt to automate in the U.S. ended badly 
because of the rapid obsolescence of the equipment.14 AT&T opened chip assembly plants in 
Singapore and Thailand in 1985. IBM announced a large chip assembly investment in China in 
2000, but ended up selling that operation plus a testing facility in Singapore to Amkor, a major 
Korea-based assembly subcontractor, in 2004 as part of a plan to move from in-house offshore to 
100%-outsourced assembly.15
                                                     
9 A complete analysis of the connection between the offshoring of assembly and industry competitiveness is beyond the 
scope of this paper. The move provided short-term breathing space for U.S. firms facing low-cost competition. This is 
not to say that other strategies might not have provided equal or better results. 
10 Calculated from Semiconductor Industry Association market statistics available at www.sia-
online.org/pre_statistics.cfm. 
11 Henderson (1989, p. 51). 
12 Flamm (1985, Table 3-7). 
13 Flamm (1985, p.  52). 
14 ibid. (p. 69). 
15 “IBM jettisons IC-packaging units, sells plants to Amkor,” Silicon Strategies, May 18, 2004. 
  Brown and Linden - 6 
 Several factors contributed to the movement of assembly offshore. First, Japanese 
manufacturers, who automated their assembly lines, provided stiff competition for American 
producers.16 Automation was a more feasible strategy for the Japanese because of their relatively 
greater reliance on high-volume memory chips, which involve long production runs. U.S. 
companies produced a wider range of products which were less economical to automate.17 Also, 
the military, which had been the primary early adopter of semiconductors, was steadily replaced 
by the consumer electronics industry, with its attendant price pressures, during the 1960s.18 
Furthermore, U.S. policy was permissive because tariffs were limited to the value added offshore, 
which in the case of assembly was a relatively small portion of the total – about 12% in the late 
1970s.19
 By 1977, U.S. companies employed close to 100,000 workers in offshore assembly 
plants, compared to 114,000 domestic employees, of whom 64,000 were directly involved in 
production.20 The overseas expansion resulted in a decline in domestic assembly jobs. U.S. 
factories were closed during recessions, and new jobs added overseas during upturns. Job-loss 
data from the period of peak overseas expansion (1968-1972) aren’t available; but from 1975 to 
1982, 8,500 former chip assembly workers were certified for trade-adjustment assistance, and 
another 3,000 applied but were refused.21
 There was, however, an offsetting gain in consumer surplus from the low prices of the re-
imported chips. Flamm (1985) estimates the welfare cost of repatriating assembly and making it 
profitable with tariff barriers to be about $1 billion for 1983, which can be thought of as an upper 
bound for the consumer surplus created by the move offshore.22
 In terms of assembly, the U.S. chip industry “hollowed out.” Flamm (1985) estimated 
that in 1978 around 80% of U.S. semiconductor production was assembled abroad.23 The figure is 
now probably above 95%, with most remaining U.S. facilities predominantly engaged in 
prototyping and military jobs. This implies U.S. firms are doing around 60% of assembly in 
offshore subsidiaries.  
 History suggests that the move offshore helped keep U.S. chip firms competitive with the 
new rivals from Asia, and this was important for protecting the remaining jobs in the industry. 
When Flamm published his landmark study, the U.S. chip industry was in a period of decline, but 
in spite of the move to offshore assembly rather than because of it. When the industry sought U.S. 
government help, the fabrication stage of production was where the U.S. capability was seen as 
deficient, and fabrication was the focus of the joint public-private research consortium, 
SEMATECH, launched in 1986. 
 Thus chip assembly provides an example where the offshoring of one part of the value 
chain to reduce costs was important for maintaining overall cost competitiveness against 
international rivals, albeit at the expense of specific (primarily low-skilled) jobs in the short run. 
B. The appearance of new suppliers 
 Offshore chip assembly offers an additional lesson that is worth noting briefly, namely 
that in-house offshoring can generate technology diffusion to foreign companies. 
 In countries where entrepreneurial conditions are favorable, foreign investment stimulates 
the emergence of local companies, often started by ex-employees of the foreign company, that 
offer low-end versions of the foreign company’s technology. In the case of chip assembly, this 
                                                     
16 Henderson (1989, p. 45). 
17 Flamm (1985, p. 92). 
18 Henderson (1989, p. 43). 
19 Flamm (1985, Table 3-10). 
20 ibid. (p. 91). 
21 ibid. (p. 96). 
22 Flamm (1985, p. 96). 
23 Flamm (1985, p. 82). 
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has meant the emergence of a number of contract assemblers that complement, and arguably 
strengthen,  the U.S. semiconductor industry. With Asian suppliers covering more mature 
technologies, the foreign subsidiaries are able to specialize in higher-value types of chip 
packaging. 
 Beginning in the late 1960s, local Asian firms started offering contract chip assembly 
services to the U.S.-owned plants. Today, roughly one third of all chip assembly is foreign 
outsourced, and the figure has been growing rapidly in recent years as the complexity and 
diversity of packages has increased.24 The top 10 assembly contractors, with about 70% of total 
contracting revenue in 2003, are all Asia-based, which reflects a strong link to the initial 
locational choices of U.S. firms.25
 The Asia-based outsourcing providers have become more technologically sophisticated 
and can serve as important technology partners for U.S. producers.26 The requirements for chip 
packages have become quite challenging with the growing complexity of chips, the need to fit 
into size-sensitive products like mobile phones, and an increasing danger of package-induced 
electrical problems. The engineers at the leading Asian assembly companies are able to 
participate with the chip designers at an early stage to avoid problems with the final product.27 
The availability of multiple Asian suppliers allows chip companies access to the large array of 
package types that are now available, since few U.S. firms have the scale to supply internally all 
types that they need. The availability of assembly services is also vital to the growing group of 
design-specialist “fabless” firms, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 The entry of companies from industrializing economies into the chip assembly business 
has not brought about the exit of U.S. companies from the activity. Many U.S.-owned offshore 
assembly plants from the industry’s early days are still in operation, and new ones are still being 
built, such as Intel’s assembly plants in China.28 The main reasons for keeping assembly in-house 
are technological, because electrical interaction between the packaging and the circuitry (a 
growing problem as the circuits shrink) can affect performance and reliability. There is also a 
strategic aspect of avoiding over-dependence on an assembly contractor. Furthermore, outsourced 
test (often provided with assembly) exposes some of the chip’s embedded intellectual property. 
So the chips most likely to be outsourced by the major chip firms are low-end or otherwise 
mature chips where electrical interference and intellectual property are less of a concern. Chip 
makers also use outsourcing providers for buffer capacity in the case of excess demand and to 
handle specialized packages for low-volume products, for which the outsourcing provider may 
achieve better scale economies by aggregating across multiple customers. 
 
III. Offshore Fabrication: from foreign outsourcing to industry 
restructuring 
 The case of wafer fabrication is very different from that of assembly because offshore 
investments were made, beginning in the 1970s, primarily for market access in Japan and Europe, 
where trade barriers made U.S. exports uneconomical, rather than to lower production costs.29 
                                                     
24 Amkor estimates that 32% of assembly and test activity was outsourced in 2004 (reported in Amkor’s first quarter 
2005 corporate presentation, accessed June 9, 2005 at www.amkor.com/IR/AMKR_Investor_presentation.pdf). This is 
up from about 20% in 2002 (Amkor estimate reported in “Amkor: A Promising Play in Chips,” BusinessWeek Online, 
January 10, 2003). 
25 ”Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test: Preparing for the Next Boom Cycle, 2006-2008,” Chip Scale 
Review, April 2005. 
26 One of the largest assembly providers, Amkor Technology, was founded in South Korea in 1968 and technically 
became a US-based firm through an Initial Public Offering in 1998 during the Asian Financial Crisis, although control 
of the company did not change. 
27 See “How Amkor's packaging proficiency helped Cisco's switches,” Electronics Design Chain, Fall 2004, for a 
detailed case study. 
28 “Intel to build second IC assembly plant in Chengdu,” EE Times, March 23, 2005. 
29 Henderson (1989, p. 45). 
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The employment impact of these market-seeking investments was to some extent offset by the 
cross-investments of European and Japanese producers in the United States. Cost reduction via 
offshore investments in low-wage countries was not a feasible strategy because fabrication is so 
capital-intensive that labor typically accounts for 16% of costs (including depreciation) in U.S. 
fabs producing 200mm wafers, and less than 10% in the newer 300mm fabs, which undercuts the 
major labor cost advantage of most industrializing countries.30  
 In a survey of industry executives, Leachman and Leachman (2004) found that the top 
five reasons, rated very close together, for fab site selection were “Tax advantages,” “Supply of 
engineering and technical talent,” “Quality of water supply and reliability of utilities,” “Proximity 
to existing company facilities,” and “Environmental permitting process and/or other 
regulations.”31 Empirical research on fab investment data shows that host country political 
institutions, the presence of other fabs, and a firm’s prior investment experience also affect the 
location of fab investments.32 This multiplicity of concerns surrounding such a major investment 
accounts for the relatively few cases of U.S.-built fabs in industrializing countries, even with the 
rich subsidies that have been offered by countries like Singapore. 
 Despite the limited occurrence of fab investment in industrializing countries, some of 
them, especially Taiwan, have successfully fostered local chip fabrication with focused 
government programs. The most successful business model for these fabs is contract fabrication 
for chips designed elsewhere, and this outsourcing model is discussed in the next section. 
A. Foreign outsourced fabrication 
 The foreign outsourced fabrication of U.S.-designed chips to suppliers based mainly in 
Asia is a growth industry. These suppliers, known in the industry as “foundries,” manufacture 
chips to the designs of other companies and sell no chips of their own design. Although some 
integrated companies, most notably IBM, offer foundry services, the “pure-play” companies are 
the most important source of such services to the rapidly-growing design-only (“fabless”) sector.  
 The foundry-fabless business model, which emerged in the mid-1980s, was initially 
ridiculed by industry executives, most famously by Jerry Sanders, then-CEO of Advanced Micro 
Devices, who is reputed to have dismissed the phenomenon of outsourced fabrication with the 
claim that “Real men have fabs.”33 The foundry model has, however, proved to be extremely 
successful, and the technology level of the leading foundries is now close to the industry 
“bleeding edge” of companies such as Intel and IBM.34
 The dedicated foundry model originated in Taiwan in 1987, when the government 
brought together investors, licensed mature production technology from the United States, and 
attracted Taiwanese engineers and managers with experience in the U.S. chip industry. The initial 
foundry, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), remains the largest in an 
increasingly crowded field, as shown in Table 2. TSMC was founded by Morris Chang, a 
Chinese-born, MIT-educated executive with 25 years’ experience at Texas Instruments who 
moved to Taiwan in 1985.  
 At the time TSMC was created, a handful of U.S. chip companies, such as Xilinx and 
Chips & Technologies, were already outsourcing all of their manufacturing, primarily to 
                                                     
30 Authors’ calculations based on data in Appendix 2 of Howell and others (2003). Labor costs for 200mm fabs are 8% 
in Taiwan and 3% in China. 
31 Leachman and Leachman (2004, p. 226). 
32 Henisz and Macher (2004). 
33 Although the phrase is universally attributed to Mr. Sanders, the exact date and wording is obscure. 
34 “Have the foundries caught up?” Electronic Business, June 2005. Companies at the industry’s “bleeding edge” are 
the first to put a new technology generation into production, which forces them to bear a relatively large burden of 
learning costs in exchange for potential first-mover advantages. Follower firms benefit from spillover knowledge flows. 
See Ham, Linden, and Appleyard (1998, p. 140) for an example of the adoption of new wafer sizes. 
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integrated Japanese manufacturers. This arrangement entailed certain risks over access to capacity 
and control of intellectual property that the availability of a “pure-play” foundry alleviated. 
 TSMC’s chief rival is an older Taiwanese government-backed company, United 
Microelectronics (UMC), which sold off its design activities in the late 1990s and adopted the 
foundry model. The third biggest foundry, Chartered Semiconductor, is located in Singapore and 
is part-owned by the government. 
 The newest entrant, China-based Semiconductor Manufacturing International 
Corporation (SMIC), was founded in 2000 by Richard Chang, a Taiwanese expatriate with 
experience in Taiwan’s foundry business following a U.S. graduate education and twenty years’ 
experience at Texas Instruments. SMIC’s investors include international venture capitalists and 
Chinese government entities. SMIC has successfully attracted a range of technology partners and 
customers, primarily from the United States, hired hundreds of Taiwanese engineers with foundry 
experience,35 and listed its shares on the New York Stock Exchange in 2004. 
 The technology level of China’s fabrication capability is theoretically limited by the 
Wassenaar Arrangement of 1996, by which more than thirty countries agreed to restrict exports of 
dual-use technologies that might undermine international security. Interpretation and 
enforcement, however, are left up to individual member states, and most countries with chip 
equipment industries other than the United States have been unwilling to curb exports of 
advanced chip-making equipment to China.36 In 2003, the U.S. government issued SMIC a 
special license specifying that it does not make chips for military use, which allowed U.S. 
equipment makers to compete on a more even basis with their Japanese and European rivals.37
TABLE 2: Top Six Pure-Play* Foundries, 2004 
(Total revenue $16,695 million) 
Company Country 2004 Revenue 
(US$ millions) 
2004/2003 
Growth 
2004 Share 
of Total 
TSMC Taiwan $7,648 31% 45.8% 
UMC Taiwan $3,900 42% 23.4% 
Chartered Singapore $1,103 52% 6.6% 
SMIC China $ 975 166% 5.8% 
Vanguard Taiwan $ 474 66% 2.8% 
DongbuAnam S.Korea $435 32% 2.6% 
Source: IC Insights, reported in “China gains in 2004 pure-play foundry rankings,” EE 
Times, March 28, 2005.  
* “Pure-play” foundries are those dedicated to foundry services and exclude companies 
that manufacture their own chips as well as offer foundry services. 
 
  The advent of government-funded manufacturing in Asia raised concerns about a 
potential loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States, especially since the U.S. semiconductor 
industry had seen its fortunes slip during the 1980s as U.S. DRAM makers lost market dominance 
to Japanese companies. However the Asian foundries contributed to the resurgence of the U.S. 
chip industry, since they facilitated the blossoming of design-only (or “fabless”) chip companies, 
especially in California, during the 1990s.38
 Over the last ten years, fabless revenue (C.A.G.R. of 20%) has been growing faster then 
the semiconductor industry as a whole (C.A.G.R. of 7%), and worldwide fabless revenue was 
                                                     
35 “TSMC Sues SMIC,” Electronic News, December 22, 2003. 
36 “Chip-equipment export rules to China are unclear and 'ineffective',” Semiconductor Business News, February 15, 
2002. 
37 “SMIC obtains special license for advanced U.S. fab gear,” Silicon Strategies, September 30, 2003. 
38 Macher, Mowery, and Hodges (1998). 
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$20.6 billion in 2003. Of the top thirty fabless firms that year, twenty were U.S.-based and had a 
combined revenue of $13.5 billion. The next most important location for fabless companies is 
Taiwan, where six of the top 30 firms (combined revenue of $2.8 billion) in 2003 were located.39 
Table 3 shows the top 10 fabless firms of 2004. 
 
TABLE 3: Top 10 Fabless Companies, 2004 
(Total Revenue: $33 billion) 
Company (Location) 2004 Revenue 
(US $ millions) 
Qualcomm (Calif.) $3,224.0 
Broadcom (Calif.) $2,400.6 
ATI Technologies (Canada) $2,140.9 
Nvidia (Calif.) $2,010.0 
SanDisk (Calif.) $1,777.1 
Xilinx (Calif.) $1,588.7 
MediaTek (Taiwan) $1,252.5 
Marvell Semiconductor (Calif.) $1,224.6 
Altera (Calif.) $1,016.4 
Conexant (Calif.) $ 914.6 
Source: Fabless Semiconductor Association, cited in “Worldwide Fabless Revenue Grew 
27% in 2004, FSA Revealed,” Nikkei Electronics Asia Online, March 18, 2005. 
 
 In addition to supporting the increasingly important fabless sector, the Asian foundries 
are also permitting integrated firms, from smaller players all the way up the world’s third-largest 
chip firm, Texas Instruments, to hedge the enormous risk of building new factories by using the 
foundries for buffer capacity and even for fabricating leading-edge chips that have a short product 
life or uncertain volume.  
 The availability of buffer capacity in Asia has allowed chip producers to build less 
fabrication capacity, which reduces the risk of facing unutilized capacity with a large fixed 
depreciation expense. Fab-owning companies (called integrated device manufacturers, or IDMs) 
can keep their own fabs fully booked and shift excess demand to the foundries as needed. The 
foundries adjust their prices as their capacity utilization varies. IDMs began shifting business to 
foundries in the mid-1990s and in recent years have accounted for approximately 45% of foundry 
revenue.40 Looked at another way, 20 to 25% of the value of the semiconductor industry is being 
manufactured on a (mostly-foreign) outsourced basis.41
 Although the outsourcing trend represents a shift of manufacturing to Asia, it seems 
unlikely that the U.S. semiconductor industry will ever entirely cease domestic fabrication. At the 
leading edge, companies like Intel, IBM, and Texas Instruments derive advantage from 
implementing advanced process technologies for their flagship products at the earliest possible 
time. Companies like Freescale (formerly Motorola) and Micron benefit from running non-
standard processes. In all these cases, fab ownership affords closer interaction between the design 
and manufacturing functions and helps to ensure the protection of key trade secrets. Nevertheless, 
as the foundries add capacity and smaller fab-owning firms decline to invest in new plants, the 
number of fab-owning firms will likely decline. 
                                                     
39 Data from IC Insights reported in “SanDisk, Silicon Labs leap in 2003 fabless rankings,” Silicon Strategies, March 
18, 2004. 
40 Data reported by Semico Research Corp, reported in “System houses remain weak link for silicon foundries,” Silicon 
Strategies, May 11, 2004. 
41 Authors’ calculations, assuming that foundry revenue represents about one-third the value of the final chip price. 
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 There is a limit to the eventual size of the foundry sector. For example, Intel will continue 
internal (but not entirely domestic) fabrication of its PC microprocessors because they depend on 
leading-edge process technology that is part of the company’s competitive advantage.42 Samsung, 
the leading memory maker, will continue internal fabrication of its memory chips, since they 
require high volume, low cost production runs with short product life cycles. Intel and Samsung, 
the top two semiconductor companies worldwide, accounted for 21.4% of industry sales in 
2004.43 The major category of chips that are manufactured by foundries are logic chips, including 
a range of general-purpose and application-specific products, and mixed-signal chips, which 
primarily use standard processes. All told, outsourced manufacturing, the bulk of which occurs 
overseas, will probably never exceed 50% of the semiconductor industry.44  
B. Offshore fab investments 
 Another way to look at semiconductor fabrication in the United States is to consider 
where fab investment takes place, and the data reveal a growing shift away from U.S. investment 
in domestic fabs. These historical data come from our colleagues Leachman and Leachman 
(2004). Table 4 shows fab capacity in terms of where it’s located in 1980, 1990, and 2001.45 The 
shift of capacity from Japan and the United States to the rest of Asia (primarily South Korea and 
Taiwan) is striking. Japan and the United States accounted for 80% of fab capacity in 1980, but 
only 49% of capacity in 2001.  
TABLE 4: Regional Location and Ownership of Worldwide Fabrication Capacity 
(For each year, capacity location is shown on top and  
capacity ownership is shown beneath it in parentheses.) 
 
Year 
 
Asia ex-Japan 
Europe/ 
Middle East 
 
Japan 
 
North 
America 
1980 4% 
(3%) 
16% 
(15%) 
38% 
(37%) 
42% 
(44%) 
1990 12% 
(12%) 
13% 
(9%) 
45% 
(45%) 
30% 
(36%) 
2001 38% 
(39%) 
13% 
(8%) 
20% 
(24%) 
29% 
(38%) 
Source: Leachman and Leachman (2004), Tables 8.2, 8.4 
Note: The ownership row total for 2001 adds to more than 100 because jointly owned 
capacity was credited in full to all owners. 
 
 However looking at the same data in terms of region of ownership (shown in parenthesis) 
show that, although the rise of capacity owned by companies in Asia ex-Japan mirrors the rise of 
location capacity, the decline of capacity owned by U.S. companies is less severe than the fall in 
capacity located in the U.S. Although only 29% of fab capacity in 2001 was in the United States, 
U.S. companies had ownership stakes in almost 40% of global capacity. 
 Because so many fabs owned by companies in one region are located in another, these 
data do not directly answer the question of how much U.S.-owned capacity is located outside the 
                                                     
42 In addition to its multiple fabs in the United States, Intel fabricates microprocessors in Israel (since 1985) and Ireland 
(since 1993). 
43 Gartner Dataquest data reported in “Gartner differs with rivals in top-10 chip rankings,” EE Times, March 23, 2005. 
44 See “More Changes Ahead for Foundries, Industry,” Electronic News, December 4, 2003, for a similar analysis. 
45 Because older fabs use a range of wafer sizes and linewidths, the underlying data have been normalized using a 
capacity metric based on the number of functions, where a function is one memory bit or one logic gate. 
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United States. Rob Leachman generously helped us to make this calculation.46 In 2001, 
approximately one-third of U.S.-owned capacity was located offshore as shown in Table 5. The 
offshore fabs were primarily in Japan and Europe, which reflects the rise of joint ventures to 
share risk as the cost of fabs increased. Conversely, about 22% of the fab capacity located in 
North America was owned by companies based in other regions (not shown). 
TABLE 5: Distribution of North-American-Owned Fab Capacity, 2001 
North America 65.4%
Europe/Middle East 18.6%
Japan 13.0%
Asia ex-Japan 3.0%
Source: Calculations courtesy of Rob Leachman. 
 
 The trend toward Asian manufacturing is continuing. The largest - and potentially most 
efficient - fabs today utilize 300mm (12-inch) diameter wafers.47 Table 6 shows the geographical 
distribution of existing and announced capacity as of late 2004. Taiwan already has one of the 
largest concentrations of these mega-factories, which are needed by the foundries and memory 
chip producers to keep their unit costs low, even as it greatly increases their exposure to the risk 
of excess capacity. The major Japanese companies have also made a significant commitment to 
the technology, although most of these fabs are not yet in full operation. Leading U.S. firms, such 
as Texas Instruments, were early adopters of the 300mm technology, but are slowing down their 
commitment to new fabs, in part because of their ability to turn to foundries for buffer capacity. 
SMIC’s newest fab constitutes China’s entry in the 300mm list. 
 As of October 2004, thirty-six 300mm fabs were in various stages of construction in 
addition to the twenty-four already in production.48 Each of these fabs requires annual revenues of 
well over $1 billion to be profitable.49 As has occurred following previous construction cycles in 
the semiconductor industry, the new fabs will likely result in a period of overcapacity until 
demand grows sufficiently. 
TABLE 6: 300mm Fabs Producing, Equipping, or Under Construction, Oct.2004 
Japan 24%
U.S. 24%
Taiwan 19%
Europe 14%
S.Korea 12%
Singapore 3% 
China 5% 
Source: Strategic Marketing Associates (www.scfab.com), based on theoretical full 
capacity and on fab location. Total adds to more than 100% because of rounding. 
 
                                                     
46 The Leachman data do not include ownership shares for jointly-owned fabs. We divided such fabs by the number of 
regions (2 or 3) involved in ownership to estimate the U.S. share. As much as 10% of U.S.-owned capacity was in joint 
venture fabs in 2001, but those fabs were spread across all regions, so our estimation error is not likely to be more than 
1 or 2 % up or down from the figures in the table. 
47 Many of the 300mm generation of fabs are still being expanded to efficient scale. Projected cost savings of about 
30% per chip are expected from these fabs when they are equipped to efficient scale and running at full capacity (Rob 
Leachman, personal communication, May 2005). When such fabs are not running at full volume, losses mount quickly 
because of the rapid equipment depreciation. 
48 Data from Strategic Marketing Associates  (www.scfab.com). 
49 Authors’ calculation, suggested by Toshihiko Osada, based on data in Appendix 2 of Howell and others (2003). 
Annual depreciation and operating expense for a U.S.-based 300mm fab running 6,000 wafers per week on a 90-
nanometer process totaled $975,000. 
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C. Fabs and employment 
 This section discusses the impact of globalized fabrication on U.S. white-collar 
employment. Although the advent of outsourced manufacturing in Asia did not represent a 
transfer of capacity that entailed a shutdown of U.S. facilities, it has very probably reduced the 
number of facilities that would otherwise have been built here, which represents the loss of a 
number of potentially high-skilled jobs. TSMC, which accounts for about half the pure-play 
foundry market, currently operates one 300mm and five 200mm fabs in Taiwan (plus one in 
Washington state). 
 We have detailed staffing data on earlier-generation fabs gathered in the mid-90s by the 
Berkeley Competitive Semiconductor Manufacturing (CSM) Program.50 The data describe the 
average employment distribution at a sample of fabs running 150mm and 200mm wafers in four 
countries.51 
 As wafer size increases, output rises for a given level of wafer throughput, and both 
materials handling and information systems become more automated to more safely handle the 
increased weight and value of each wafer and to minimize human error. Automation changes the 
composition of the workforce as the need increases for engineers and declines for operators. In 
the CSM data, engineers increase from 15% to 24% of the total workforce between 150mm- and 
200mm-generation plants, with a corresponding decline in operators from 73% to 62% (see 
Table 7) even as the overall employment level of the fab stayed approximately the same at about 
750 workers.  
TABLE 7: Work Force Composition  
(Mean Headcount in Matched 150mm and 200mm Fabs) 
 150mm 200mm 
Operators 547 (73%) 470 (62%) 
Technicians 91 (12%) 107 (14%) 
Engineers 114 (15%) 181 (24%) 
Total 752 758 
Source: Brown and Campbell, 2001. 
 
 The shifting of jobs from operators to engineers in the transition from 150mm to 200mm 
fabs results in the growth of engineering jobs paying from $29,000 to $56,000 per year and the 
decline in operator jobs paying $14,000 to $37,000 per year (see Table 8). The initial pay of 
technicians and engineers is over one-third higher in the high-tech 200mm fabs, and their pay 
premium compared to operators has increased.  
                                                     
50 The CSM program is a multi-disciplinary study of the semiconductor industry established in 1991 by a grant from 
the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation with additional support from the semiconductor industry. Further details are available at 
esrc.berkeley.edu/csm/. 
51 Twenty-three fabs in four countries were part of the CSM survey. For this table, the 150mm wafers fabs were 
matched to the 200mm wafers fabs by company, so that the company human resource policies are comparable between 
the two groups, which reduced the sample to fourteen. 
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TABLE 8: Work Force Compensation 
(Mean Wage or Salary in Matched 150mm and 200mm Fabs) 
 150mm 200mm 
 Initial pay Maximum 
pay 
Initial pay Maximum 
pay 
Operators 
(hourly) 
 
$5.88 
 
$15.47 
 
$7.12 
 
$18.44 
Technicians 
(hourly) 
 
$6.68 
 
$11.50 
 
$9.12 
 
$15.83 
Engineers 
(monthly) 
 
$1,785 
 
$5,019 
 
$2,381 
 
$4,689 
Source: Brown and Campbell, 2001. 
 
 A look at the returns to experience, which are proxied by the maximum pay, shows that 
engineers fare less well. Experienced technicians and operators have the same pay improvement 
in the 200mm fab as do the new hires. However, the experienced engineers are losing out over 
time as their mean maximum salary is actually lower in the 200mm fabs. In interviews, we 
learned that fabs liked having young engineers with knowledge of new technology, and they did 
not worry about losing older engineers. Over time, consequently, fabs were willing to increase 
wages of new hires without raising the wages of experienced engineers. Rapidly changing 
technology plus an ample supply of new hires and low turnover allowed the companies to flatten 
engineers’ career ladders with no adverse consequences. 
 We do not have comparable data for the 300mm fab, which typically costs $2-3 billion 
(depending upon the size), has 100% automation of materials handling and wafer processing, and 
fabricates a wafer that is 2.25 times larger than the 200mm wafer.  The overall cost per chip in the 
300mm fab is more than 30 percent lower compared to the 200mm fab. 
 Because these new 300mm fabs are processing advanced circuits, such as those using 
90nm processes, the amount of inspection, metrology steps, and in-line engineering-related 
activities are significantly higher than their older 200mm counterparts for the same wafer 
throughput. As a result, most of the 300mm worker savings achieved with the automation of 
materials handling, often cited to allow approximately 30% less labor input, is now being re-
applied to the new engineering tasks, which are much higher value added and more intellectually 
challenging, and include more troubleshooting. Therefore the number of workers has not been 
reduced as a result of the advanced factory automation; instead there has been a shift in task 
composition. The percentage of workers with higher engineering and technical problem-solving 
skills has greatly increased, while the percentage of workers needed for wafer movement and 
equipment starting and stopping has greatly decreased. However the proportion of engineers has 
not increased.52 
 So what is the net employment impact of fabrication offshoring? According to the 
Semiconductor Industry Association, U.S. chip firms employed 103,000 engineers in 2003, of 
which 30% were located offshore. The share of offshore employment had not grown since 1998, 
and in fact fell during the Internet/telecom bubble before returning to 30%.53
 As a back of the envelope calculation, we estimate that if all foundry production were 
based in the United States instead of Asia, it might add 11,000 jobs, of which some 2,600 would 
                                                     
52 Personal communication, April 2005.  
53 Data are from the annual SIA Semiconductor Workforce Strategy Committee Survey, referenced in “SIA Workforce 
Strategy Overview,” a presentation by David R. Ferrell to the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department Heads 
Association annual meeting, March 22, 2005. Accessible as of April 21, 2005 at www.ecedha.org/Temp04-
05/agenda.html. 
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be highly-paid engineers.54 But it must be noted that not all foundry sales are to U.S. customers. 
In 2003, for example, half of TSMC’s gross revenue came from non-U.S. sources.55
 As a point of comparison, the Fabless Semiconductor Association reported that publicly-
traded fabless companies in North America employ approximately 45,000 workers as of 
December 2004.56 A review of company information suggests that more than half of these are 
software or hardware engineers, although an unknown share of them are located offshore. 
 To summarize this section, offshore investments in fabrication were driven by market 
access concerns more than by cost reduction, and have been at least partially offset by reciprocal 
investments from leading foreign producers. Meanwhile, the availability of outsourced fabrication 
in Asia played to the U.S. strength in design by facilitating the emergence of the fabless chip 
industry. The Asian foundries are probably also part of a long-run reduction of U.S. chip 
manufacturing, but any loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs has been gradual, and the loss of chip 
manufacturing jobs to foundries has probably been offset to some extent by the increase in design 
jobs. The reliance of the U.S. semiconductor industry on high-end design jobs is one of the 
reasons that chip design, the latest frontier for offshoring, which is addressed in the next section, 
may be a cause for greater concern. 
 
IV. Offshore Design 
 The picture for offshore design by U.S. semiconductor companies is still taking shape. 
Although some design has been done offshore since at least the 1970s, the pace of offshoring has 
noticeably increased in the last few years, and there is growing evidence that the U.S. market for 
chip design engineers has been adversely affected. 
A. The economics of chip design 
 Chip design is highly skill-intensive, since it employs only college-trained engineers. A 
couple of medium-size chip designs will employ as many electrical engineers as a fab for a year 
or more (although the skills are not directly transferable). A complex chip design like Intel’s 
Pentium 4, with 42 million transistors on a 180nm linewidth process, engaged hundreds of 
engineers for the full length of the five-year project.57 Design teams can also be as small as a few 
engineers, and project duration varies from months to years. Team size depends on the 
complexity of the project, the speed with which it must be completed, and the resources available. 
 The design of an integrated circuit is a hierarchical procedure that passes through 
identifiable stages with feedback as needed. With considerable simplification, the stages are 
specification, logic design, and physical design. Once the chip has reached the prototype stage, it 
needs to be validated in a hardware simulation of a complete system. Parallel with this process, 
the design must be repeatedly verified, and the software that will be part of the chip, and that will 
run on it, needs to be written. 
 The highest-level design stage is the general specification for how the chip as a whole 
will behave within the system of which it’s a part. This is a high-value-added function that 
applies the company’s market knowledge and intellectual property in deciding what feature set 
will be most profitable. 
                                                     
54 TSMC, which accounts for about half the foundry industry, has one 150mm, one 300mm, and five-and-a-half 
200mm fabs outside the United States. These fabs probably have different rated capacities, but we can approximate 
employment by calculating 750 workers per plant, which works out to 5,625. Doubling that to approximate the entire 
foundry sector brings us to 11,250. 
55 Note 27c of Form 20-F filed by TSMC with the Securities and Exchange Commission for fiscal year ended 
December 31, 2003. 
56 FSA “Global Fabless Fundings and Financials Report, Q4 2004”. 
57 “Comms held Pentium 4 team together,” EE Times, November 1, 2000. “Linewidth” refers to the size of the features 
etched on a wafer during the fabrication process. Each semiconductor process generation is named for the smallest 
feature that can be produced. 
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 The next stage, logic design, uses symbolic abstractions to describe how signals will be 
processed within the chip, first at the register level, then at the gate level. 
 The final stage, physical design, involves the translation of the abstract version into a 
map of actual wires and devices interconnecting across multiple layers on the silicon surface. 
 Electronic design automation (EDA) includes both the use of software tools by engineers 
to realize their designs and the actual automation of specific parts of the design with less 
engineering input, especially at the later stages of mainstream digital designs. 
 Table 9 shows the change in the effort required at each stage of design over succeeding 
generations of process technology, from 350 nanometer linewidths, first introduced in the mid-
1990s, to 130nm, which entered volume production in 2003. The underlying project is assumed to 
be a digital logic design, the industry’s typical product. Other types of design, such as analog or 
memory chips, require different engineering inputs. The overall chip is assumed to be more 
complex at each linewidth as miniaturization allows more functions to be packed onto a chip. In 
raw terms (transistors per engineer per year), design engineer productivity improved by a factor 
of more than 20 during the 1990s.58
  
TABLE 9: Engineer Hours to Design 1 Million Logic Transistors 
   
350nm
 
250nm
 
180nm
 
130nm
Change from 
350nm to 
130nm 
Specification 23.0 29.8 91.4 271.6 1081% 
Logic Design 714.2 738.4 756.4 837.7 17% 
Physical Design 311.0 357.2 391.7 473.5 52% 
Validation 103.7 127.6 164.5 197.4 90% 
Software 378.4 672.4 985.7 1798.3 375% 
Total 1530.3 1925.4 2389.7 3578.5 134% 
Source: International Business Strategies (2002), used with permission. 
Note: The average number of transistors in a typical logic design increases by a factor of 
about two with each reduction in linewidth. The table normalizes the hours required for 1 
million transistors at each generation based on the assumption that the underlying project 
is increasingly complex: 2 million transistors at 350nm, 5 million at 250nm, 20 million at 
180nm, and 40 million at 130nm. 
  
 The biggest changes involve the importance of software in the design process, which now 
accounts for one-half of the total engineer hours. Although software is typically not considered 
part of chip design as such, software expertise is increasingly important for the competitive 
advantage of semiconductor firms.59 Chips today are often integrated to system-level complexity 
because of the size, reliability, and other advantages this brings. Greater integration means that 
the system software must be generated in parallel with the system-level chip for reasons of 
coherence and, especially, time-to-market. It is this need to plan carefully for the hardware-
software co-design that has caused the specification portion of chip designs to explode by 1081% 
over the last four technology generations. 
 The software effort itself has increased by 375%. According to one software executive, a 
typical chip in 1995 went into a stand-alone product and required 100,000 lines of code. In 2002, 
a typical chip for a networked programmable product requires a million lines of code.60
                                                     
58 Semiconductor Industry Association (2003). 
59 Linden, Brown, and Appleyard (2004). 
60 Jerry Fiddler, chairman of Wind River Systems, cited in “Keynoter says chip value is in its intellectual property,” EE 
Times, June 14, 2002. 
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 The software, plus the greater complexity of chips themselves, has caused design 
validation hours to grow by 90% for each million transistors. 
 By comparison, the growth levels for the actual design engineering jobs of logic and 
physical design for each million transistors are a relatively modest 17 and 52%, respectively. This 
is largely because, as chips have gotten more complex, the process of chip design has become 
more automated.61 The number of transistors that can be fabricated on a given area of silicon has 
doubled every 18 months for roughly 40 years, a phenomenon known as “Moore’s Law,” after 
Gordon Moore, one of the founders of Intel. In the early 1960s, digital ICs contained fewer than 
50 transistors.62 The industry can now place some 100 million transistors on a chip, and Intel 
predicts a billion-transistor processor by 2007.63
 The automation that enables the design of today’s complex chips has evolved in parallel 
with the rise in complexity. At the beginning of the industry, designs were hand-drawn and hand-
transferred to a template that was used to make the actual circuit. In the 1970s, the later stages of 
the process were computerized, and in the 1980s they were automated. 
 The introduction of automation, along with the advent of high-bandwidth 
telecommunications, gave chip companies the ability to subdivide the design process across 
multiple locations. 
 These advances pertain primarily to digital designs, i.e., those that work on binary 
streams of data. Designs that utilize all, or mostly, analog circuits, which process continuous 
signals such as sound waves, are also done with EDA tools, but are not so easily automated and 
require more experienced designers with specific training. 
 We now consider, in turn, the in-house offshoring and international outsourcing of chip 
design. 
B. Offshore design 
 The in-house offshoring of chip design can occur for any of the three reasons pertaining 
to competitive advantage: closer contact with customers, access to specialized skilled labor, and 
cost reduction. 
 Most early offshore design investments by U.S. companies through the 1970s, like 
offshore fabrication investments of the same period, were market-driven and limited to Japan and 
Western Europe.64 By the mid-1980s, a handful of offshore design investments had been made in 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, which are the more advanced economies of East Asia outside 
Japan.65 These design centers were dedicated to adapting existing chips to local market needs.66
 The prime example of the market access motivation for offshore investment is the 
"application-specific" IC (ASIC), a logic chip designed for a specific customer. U.S.-based ASIC 
producers like IBM and LSI Logic have established design centers in all major markets of Europe 
and Asia to facilitate the interaction of their engineers with their customers. These companies also 
maintain other offshore design centers that develop the "cells" or building blocks that are later 
combined in various ways, and these centers may be low-cost seeking or skill-seeking. 
 Specialized skills are an important reason that U.S. semiconductor companies invest 
overseas. Britain, for example, has developed expertise in consumer multimedia, and 
Scandinavian countries are noted for their skills in wireless network technology. These 
specialized skill bases are often accessed by acquisition of an existing company that continues as 
a subsidiary. Examples abound. In 2000, Broadcom acquired Element 14, a British fabless 
company with 68 employees specializing in central office ADSL technology that became 
                                                     
61 Hemani (2004). 
62 Borrus (1988, p. 75). 
63 “Intel readies road map for billion-transistor processors,” EE Times, January 4, 2002. 
64 Henderson (1989 p. 48). 
65 ibid. (Figure 4.2). 
66 ibid. (p. 58). 
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Broadcom UK Ltd.67 In 2001, Agilent acquired Sirius, a Belgian designer of cellular chips for the 
CDMA standard with 19 employees, and made it a research and design center for next-generation 
cellular technology.68 In 2005, Intel acquired Oplus, a successful maker of chips for digital 
television with 100 workers and that will remain an independent subsidiary.69
 As was true of fabrication, in-house design offshoring works both ways, and many 
foreign companies maintain a Silicon Valley or other U.S. design center to take advantage of the 
high skills and productivity available there as well as have access to U.S. customers. Philips of 
the Netherlands, for example, bought VLSI Technology, a major ASIC company with over 2,000 
employees (about one-third of whom were fab workers), in 1999 for nearly $1 billion.70 Hitachi 
Semiconductor has a U.S. design group several hundred strong.71 Toshiba has a network of seven 
ASIC design centers around the United States.72 Even foreign start-ups may need to have a U.S. 
design team to work with U.S. customers or to access leading-edge analog design skills. 
 The category of in-house design offshoring that is perhaps growing the fastest – or at 
least getting the most attention – is cost reduction. For Silicon Valley firms, some cost reduction 
is available by opening satellite design centers elsewhere in the U.S., where some locations have 
average engineering salaries that are up to 20% lower than salaries in the Silicon Valley. But 
these salaries are still much higher than salaries in India and elsewhere, as discussed below.73 The 
prospects for cost reduction offshore are better than ever because of changes in the last 20 years 
that have seen high-bandwidth infrastructure extended around the globe and the economic 
liberalization of large economic areas in Eastern Europe, and especially Asia.74
 Dividing chip designs across locations presents a number of managerial challenges, as we 
have learned from interviews and press reports. The sacrifice of face-to-face interaction between 
different parts of the design team can adversely affect productivity, and distance makes it harder 
to evaluate and reward individual contributions to team performance. Task assignments must be 
more carefully codified for offshore teams than for locally-based engineers, and managers will 
need to travel periodically between locations. When the separation is across borders, there are 
also cultural differences that can make communication less effective. An Intel engineer was 
reported to say that cultural differences were the single biggest problem in managing design 
teams between California and Israel, and this separation did not include any language 
differences.75
 Cost-driven in-house offshoring incurs other costs that partially offset the difference in 
salaries, especially during the early stages of establishing an offshore design center. One that is 
often mentioned is the lower quality and productivity of inexperienced engineers. This raises 
monitoring costs, and offshore engineers may also require a longer training period than a U.S. 
team would need. Additional controls may also be needed to protect key intellectual property. 
According to a venture capitalist, the actual savings from going offshore is more likely to be 25 to 
50% rather than the 80 to 90% suggested by a simple salary comparison.76
 Design offshoring can run up against national security barriers. For example, the U.S. 
government has placed limits on the export of advanced encryption technology. Communications 
chips that employ such technology are difficult to design offshore. Either the chip design must be 
                                                     
67 “Broadcom acquires Element 14 for $600 million, enters ADSL chip market,” Semiconductor Business News, 
October 4, 2000. 
68 “Agilent to buy Belgium's Sirius to offer new CDMA chip solutions,” Semiconductor Business News, May 21, 2001. 
69 “Intel buys into consumer sector with Oplus acquisition,” Silicon Strategies, February 24, 2005. 
70 “Philips to acquire VLSI Technology for $953 million,” Semiconductor Business News, May 3, 1999. 
71 “Hitachi Forms North America Semiconductor Systems Solutions Unit,” Hitachi Press Release, September 2, 1998. 
72 “Toshiba Expands Soc Design Support Network With Opening Of San Diego Design Center,” Toshiba Press 
Release, November 26, 2002. 
73 “Mean wages edge closer to six-figure mark,” EE Times, August 25, 2004. 
74 Ernst (2004). 
75 “Global chip design raises promises and challenges,” EE Times, January 11, 1999. 
76 Interview, May 2004. 
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compartmentalized, with the encryption block designed only in the United States, or government 
approval, subject to possible delays, must be obtained in advance.77
 Yet despite these pitfalls, the amount of offshore design in industrializing economies has 
noticeably expanded over the last decade. Some companies value the opportunity to design on a 
24-hour cycle because of the enormous pressure to reach the market ahead of, or no later than, 
competitors. One established U.S. chip company adopted a rolling cycle between design centers 
in the United States, Europe, and India.78 More common is the bi-national arrangement used by a 
Silicon Valley start-up that had all of its design beyond the initial specification done by a China 
subsidiary established only months after the head office was set up. Ten executives in the head 
office had to train the mostly inexperienced staff in Beijing, which was about thirty strong.79 The 
Silicon Valley staff would review Beijing’s work from the previous day then spend up to three 
hours on the phone (starting around 5pm California time) providing feedback and reviewing 
assignments for that day in Beijing. In a single-location firm, this work-feedback cycle would 
take two days. 
 Venture capitalists have reportedly begun to require start-ups to include some offshoring 
in their business plans in order to better leverage their resources. A typical comment is, “We don't 
fund chip designs that don't outsource to India. If you rely on Indian contractors for the things 
they do well, you can get a chip out for under $10 million. If you don't, you can't, and you won't 
be competitive. It's that simple.”80 PortalPlayer, the company behind the key multimedia chip in 
Apple’s iPod, is a recent example of a successful start-up that set up an Indian software and chip 
design subsidiary within a few months of its founding in 1999.81
 We will discuss offshore subsidiaries again below. 
C. Domestic and foreign outsourcing of design 
 Low-cost design engineering resources can also be tapped through international 
outsourcing, although to date most design outsourcing by U.S. companies takes place 
domestically. All parts of a design, including the whole procedure from specification to finished 
chips, can be outsourced. In addition to the traditional work-to-order model, companies can also 
license standardized functional sections (e.g., a USB interface) of a system-level chip designed at 
the logic or physical level to save time. These reusable modules are known in the industry as 
“cores” or “IP blocks”.82
 The easiest part of chip design to outsource is physical design because it is a relatively 
standardized task. It is also the least sensitive part of design in terms of revealing the customer’s 
intellectual property. However for designs requiring leading-edge process technology such as 
90nm linewidths, layout has become much less straightforward because of the sensitivity of the 
atomic-scale wiring. In such a case, physical design is likely to be outsourced only by small and 
medium companies that lack the resources to develop the necessary expertise in-house. On the 
other hand, we interviewed one (well-funded) start-up whose initial design was so complex that 
outsourcing any parts wasn’t an option.83
 Another design functions that is frequently outsourced is logic verification, the resource-
intensive task of making sure that that first stages of the physical implementation are a correct 
translation of the abstract logic. At the other extreme, architectural design, or the design of key 
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functional blocks containing proprietary algorithms are the least likely to be outsourced because 
of the risk of exposing proprietary knowledge.84
 The availability of outsourcing (foreign or domestic) is particularly important for small 
companies and start-ups because of the relatively large fixed cost of EDA tools, which are 
typically licensed per engineer. One consultant estimated that the minimum annual software 
expense for a small company is $10 million.85 For the industry as a whole, EDA expense runs 
close to 1% of revenue. In that case, a company earning less than $1 billion in revenue would be 
below the efficient scale for in-house design. Only the nine largest fabless companies met that 
criterion in 2004. One consultant estimated that outsourcing even within the United States would 
save a small start-up that does fewer than five designs a year up to two-thirds the cost of doing 
the work in-house.86
 Another type of customer for outsourced design services are the systems companies, such 
as Apple Computer or Cisco. Although these companies often design chips in-house either to 
protect intellectual property or to reduce the cost of custom chips, they may turn to outside (and 
possibly offshore) service providers for part of the design process. 
 A great deal of outsourcing takes place in the United States. Many interviewees reported 
that they outsource physical design to small local companies on an as-needed basis. The leading 
suppliers of design services worldwide are the leading design automation software vendors, 
Cadence Design Systems, Synopsys, and Mentor Graphics. Their annual services revenue is 
about $300 million out of a total outsourced design market estimated at $2.5 billion.87 As this 
suggests, the remaining market is highly fragmented. 
 As might be expected from the increasing interaction of physical design with advanced 
processes mentioned previously, foundries work closely with design services providers. TSMC 
and UMC each have equity ties to a Taiwanese design service provider (Global UniChip and 
Faraday, respectively). In China, the emergence of low-cost foundries have also given rise to 
design services companies. The most advanced of these, IPCore and VeriSilicon, were both 
founded in 2001 by executives with years of experience in U.S. and Asia. In India, despite the 
lack of any significant chip manufacturing, large IT service providers such as Wipro and Tata 
Consultancy Services have expanded into semiconductor design services for international clients. 
Elsewhere, there are dozens of companies around the world able to help customers complete all 
or part of their chip designs. However most of the concern about foreign competition from low-
cost chip designers focuses on China, Taiwan, and India, which are the countries that we believe 
will have the greatest impact on the availability of design engineers outside the United States in 
the years ahead. 
D. Chip design in Asia 
 Offshore design is driven in part by the steady advance of semiconductor process 
technology, which has created vast areas of “silicon real estate” for complex chips that could 
potentially be designed. The inability of design automation to keep pace with Moore’s Law is 
sometimes referred to as a design “productivity gap.”88 The gap is to some extent exaggerated, 
since a relatively small percentage of designs are done at the leading edge in any one year.89 
Nevertheless, there is an acknowledged need for more design engineers than are available in the 
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United States, especially those with systems and analog skills, as the industry continues to grow 
amid the increase in design complexity. 
 For a clearer picture of the global market for design engineers, Table 10 provides rough 
estimates for chip designer salaries, the number of annual engineering (excluding software) 
college graduates, the number of active chip designers (excluding embedded software), and a 
rating of the intellectual property protection regime in the United States and the four key Asian 
countries. The numbers, which are based on a combination of published sources and interviews, 
suggest that engineers in the United States and Japan earn much higher pay compared to Asian 
engineers. 
 These data are imprecise and intended as a general guide only. The salaries are rough 
estimates, and their variance is large. The salaries are for engineers with five or more years 
experience in the U.S. and for engineers aged 40 in Japan, since that is the approximate age they 
exit the union and begin to experience greater salary increases. The design engineers in the other 
countries tend to be younger and less experienced, but wages are reportedly rising rapidly in 
China and India. For example, the salary range offered for a design engineer with one to three 
years experience by SanDisk in Bangalore at jobstreet.com in June 2005 was $9,200 to $18,400 
(at 43.52 Indian Rupees to the dollar). 
TABLE 10: Recent Engineering Statistics, Selected Countries 
 Annual design 
engineer base 
salary 
Annual engineering 
bachelor degrees 
conferred (1997, 
except as noted) 
Number of 
chip 
designers 
Intellectual 
property 
protection, 
2002 
(10=high) 
United States $ 82,000  60,000 45,000 8.7 
Japan $ 60,000 100,000 --a 6.2 
Taiwan $ 30,000  13,000 14,000 6.7 
China $ 15,000 150,000  7,000 4.0 
India $ 15,000 30,000 
(1990) 
 4,000 4.2 
a We have been unable to obtain an estimate for the number of chip designers in Japan. 
Sources: U.S. salary from 2004 BLS Occupational Employment Statistics web site 
(average for electronics and software engineers in NAICS 334400, Semiconductor 
Industry); Japan salary (average for circuit designer and embedded software engineers 
aged 40 years old) from Intelligence Corporation’s data on job offers in 2003;  Taiwan 
salary information from March 2005 interview with U.S. executive in Taiwan; China and 
India salaries are estimated based on a  combination of interviews, business literature and 
online job offerings; number of degrees from Appendix Table 4-18, “Science and 
Engineering Indicators 2000,” National Science Foundation; number of chip designers in 
U.S., China, and India from iSuppli as reported in “Another Lure Of Outsourcing: Job 
Expertise,” WSJ.com, April 12, 2004; number of chip designers in Taiwan from 
interview with Taiwan government consultant to industry, March 2005; Intellectual 
property protection data from World Economic Forum as cited in Economic Freedom of 
the World, 2004 Annual Report, Chapter 3 (Vancouver, Canada: Fraser Institute). All 
numbers rounded to reflect lack of precision. 
 
 The salary gap is narrower for comparable key employees. One report claimed in 1999 
that the salary ratio between the U.S. and India for experienced design engineers or managers was 
only 3-to-1.90 Profit sharing bonuses vary over the business cycle in the U.S. and Taiwan, and can 
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be an important part of compensation. Benefits, which include health insurance and Social 
Security,, and options also cloud the picture in the U.S. 
 The other columns of Table 10 also must be interpreted carefully. The number of 
engineering graduates is only an indicator of political and social commitment to the discipline and 
does not translate to chip design capability. According to some sources, the number of chip 
designers being added each year in India and China is on the order of 400 each.91
 Even the stated number of chip designers in the third column can be misleading, since 
there is confusion about the definition of “chip designer”. One industry executive claimed that the 
number of “qualified IC designers” in China is only 500.92 A Taiwan consultant didn’t even 
consider the later (and lower-skilled) stage of physical design, called “place and route,” to be part 
of chip design.93 This group amounts to about 30% of Taiwan designers as we count them in the 
table. 
 Lastly, weakness in the ratings on intellectual property protection may be driven by 
lapses in specific sectors such as pharmaceuticals, trademark goods, or recorded media, that are 
not relevant to the semiconductor industry. 
 Despite their lack of precision, these data indicate that Asian design engineers, especially 
from the emerging giant economies of China and India, represent an important source of 
supplemental engineering talent as well as a possible competitive threat. 
 To attempt to get a clearer picture of the world-wide availability of “qualified IC 
designers,” we consulted the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the leading 
professional organization for engineers, with almost 40% of its 365,000 members located outside 
the United States.94 Of IEEE’s several technical societies, the one most closely associated with 
chip design is the Solid-State Circuits Society (SSCS). Among other benefits, membership in the 
SSCS reflects an interest in accessing the latest research in the field.95 We looked at the 
geographic distribution of membership in 2001, and compared it to 1991 (estimated) for 
individual countries.96 We limited our attention to a mix of developing and developed countries 
with an active commercial chip-design sector (see Figure 1).97 Because the U.S. dominates 
membership and requires a different scale, it is not shown in Figure 1. 
 In 2001, the SSCS had 19,715 members worldwide, of whom 56% were outside the 
United States. This was up from 13,788 in 1991, when only 45% were outside the United States. 
Among the countries shown, China, Taiwan and India had three of the four fastest growing SSCS 
memberships. The United States had 8,747 SSCS members in 2001, which is estimated to have 
grown 16% over the preceding decade, which is less than the growth rate for all countries shown 
except Canada (14%). 
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FIGURE 1: Solid State Circuits Society Membership (2001) and Growth 
(1991-2001), selected countries outside the U.S.  
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Source: IEEE data and authors’ calculations. 
 
 How do these three countries compare in their chip design capabilities? 
 Taiwan has the most well-established chip design sector of the three, having benefited 
from focused government programs and the return of U.S. educated and trained engineers during 
the late 1980s.98 The Taiwanese chip design sector is mostly locally-owned, with a few 
multinational companies also operating design subsidiaries. Taiwanese companies have 
particularly embraced the fabless model, with some 60 fabless companies listed on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange in December 2004.99 By comparison, there were about 70 fabless companies 
listed on NASDAQ at that time. The 2004 output value of all Taiwan’s locally-owned design 
companies (including fabless and design service companies) was reported by the Taiwan 
Semiconductor Industry Association to be $8.15 billion.100 One advantage for these firms was the 
availability of an important local market since many Taiwanese companies design, assemble, and 
procure components for computers, communication equipment, and consumer electronics for 
world-famous brands including Hewlett-Packard, Nokia, and Sony. In 1999, 62% of Taiwan’s 
chip design revenue came from local sales.101
 While Taiwan’s design teams were praised in our interviews for their execution, which is 
a vital trait in an industry where time-to-market is often the difference between profit and loss, 
Taiwanese companies were mostly fast followers. Ironically, they are locked in to some extent by 
their reliance on business from the local systems firms, who are themselves as much as a 
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generation behind the leading-edge technology.102 From a U.S. perspective, Taiwanese 
competition for chips using last-generation technology has shortened the market windows during 
which U.S. chip companies can recoup their investments. 
 Taiwan’s government has instituted several programs to improve the local design sector, 
including a plan to train several thousand new design engineers in Taiwan’s universities, the 
creation of an exchange where local chip design houses can license reusable functional blocks, 
and an incubator where early-stage start-ups can share infrastructure and services.103 Another 
initiative aims to attract chip design subsidiaries of major semiconductor companies, with early 
takers including Sony and Broadcom (a major U.S. fabless company). In 2000, a government 
research institute created the SoC Technology Center (STC) to design functional blocks that can 
be licensed to local companies, a model Taiwan has used successfully in other segments of the 
electronics industry. The STC has over 200 engineers, most of whom have a Master’s degree or 
better104
 China appears to be following a similar pattern to Taiwan: government sponsorship, local 
access to system firms such as Haier, Huawei, and TCL that are increasingly engaged in world 
markets, and active involvement of expatriates returning from the United States.105 As of 2003, 
China claimed to have over 400 fabless design firms with total revenue of $547 million.106 Many 
of these are small, poorly managed and rapidly running through their seed money before they can 
bring a product to market.107 One interviewee, echoed by others, claimed that many, if not most, 
firms outside the top 10 - whose total revenue was $328 million in 2003 - are engaged in various 
types of reverse engineering, much of which is illegal.108 Foreign firms are often reluctant to 
bring lawsuits for fear of displeasing the authorities and the unlikelihood of winning in Chinese 
courts, but at least two U.S. companies are suing Chinese rivals in export markets for intellectual 
property violations.109
 China is not yet an important destination for design offshoring. Of the fifteen top U.S. 
semiconductor companies, a handful have opened research centers in China (compared to thirteen 
in India) as of June 2005, but most of these are targeting the local market for the time being, and, 
according to press reports, some are engaged in software or system design rather than chip design 
per se. Concerns over intellectual property protection appear to pose a greater barrier to foreign 
design activity than in India.110
 Chip design in China is at an early stage. Its relatively young chip design engineers will 
steadily build their experience. Some companies, particularly those whose founders include 
expatriates returning with foreign experience, will likely begin to impact global markets by the 
end of the decade. It is too early to predict the eventual relative importance of domestically-
owned and foreign-owned chip design activity, and whether domestic firms will be involved 
mostly with contract services or with creating and selling their own chips. 
 The Chinese government has taken many steps in support of chip design firms, some of 
the largest of whom are state-owned. Measures include tax reductions, venture investing, 
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incubators in seven major cities, and special government projects.111 A value-added tax 
preference for domestically-designed chips was phased out under U.S. pressure, and will 
reportedly be replaced by a WTO-friendly R&D fund.112
 India presents a very different picture, with benign neglect by the government, a lack of 
manufacturing for chips and systems, and weaker levels of brain circulation with its U.S.-based 
expatriates.113 Unlike Taiwan and China, India has no high-volume chip manufacturing, although 
construction has reportedly begun on a 200mm fab near Hyderabad with backing by a non-
semiconductor firm from Korea and the Andhra Pradesh state government.114 Perhaps because of 
India’s weakness in chip and electronics manufacturing India has no major fabless companies 
(i.e. companies designing chips for sale under their own brand), and its chip designers provide 
design services or work at the subsidiaries of foreign chip companies, especially U.S. and 
European firms. Design services revenues for Indian companies in 2001 were $149 million.115 
The government is in the early stages of developing policies to support domestic chip design 
firms.116 It is in the foreign subsidiaries that most of India’s chip design is taking place. 
 The foreign chip companies were attracted by Indian engineers’ use of English and the 
successful Indian software sector. Many of the early Indian investments by chip companies were 
software-focused, writing the microcode that becomes part of the chip. Over time, the Indian 
affiliates have taken on a bigger role, eventually extending to complete chip designs from 
specification to physical layout. This transition can happen quite quickly. Intel, for example, 
opened a software center in Bangalore in 1999, then started building a design team for 32-bit 
microprocessors in 2002.117
 A number of U.S. semiconductor companies have software and chip development 
operations in India, including Texas Instruments (1,000 employees), Freescale (200), Cypress 
Semiconductor (200), and National Semiconductor (80), as well as a host of fabless companies 
including Qualcomm and Nvidia. The range of activities at these centers is quite broad, and the 
training curve for domestically-educated engineers can be steep. In one instance we studied, a 
chip design project took twice as long to complete as planned.118
 The oldest and largest of these centers is that of Texas Instruments (TI), which opened a 
software center in 1985. Most other U.S. investments in India have been made since the mid-
1990s. The case of TI India, examined next, shows the potential for the other offshore chip design 
investments in India to develop over time. 
 Texas Instruments was the first semiconductor company to invest in India when it opened 
an office in Bangalore to work on its design automation software for internal use.119 In 1988, the 
company added the design of mixed-signal (analog and digital combined) chips. In 1995, TI 
added design for DSP devices, the company’s flagship product line. In 1998, TI India announced 
that it had taken its first DSP core from specification to working silicon over the preceding 2 
years, and integrated a controller with the DSP function for the first time. 
 In 2003 TI India announced that it had created a highly integrated DSL chip that was the 
first to market to include significant analog elements on the same chip as the DSP and network 
processor. During the specification phase, a team of 20 engineers went to TI’s Dallas 
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headquarters and worked for 3 months with TI system engineers and dealt directly with TI 
customers about their requirements. The 130nm-linewidth, 13-million-transistor design was 
completed in India over the next year by a team of 70, worked the first time, and gave rise to 
eight patent applications for improvements to DSL technology. TI India had 225 U.S. patents as 
of August 2003. 
 TI India also develops design library elements, the basic building blocks needed for 
physical design, for TI’s new processes. Although library elements are low-level intellectual 
property, they are critical inputs to the design process and used throughout TI’s R&D 
infrastructure. Moreover, the designers engaged in library construction are gaining valuable 
experience with designing for leading-edge process technology. 
 Since 1999, TI India has won several awards from EDN Asia, a design industry 
publication, for its chips. In 2004, a very high-performance analog-to-digital converter was touted 
during an interview by the company’s CEO, who mentioned in passing that it had been designed 
primarily in Bangalore.120
 Texas Instruments is the pioneer among the large, vertically-integrated chip companies in 
terms of the in-house offshoring of chip design to India, but it is far from unique. The trade press 
regularly publishes announcements by other semiconductor companies of expansions of their 
Indian design centers., most of which were created in the 1990s. A fabless company we 
interviewed described how they started their Indian team in 2004 with logic design and will 
eventually expand it to doing complete derivative products.121 A quarter of the company’s 500-
plus design engineers are now located in India. 
 We now turn to the thorny and complex question of the impact of the offshoring of chip 
design on the U.S. market for chip designers. 
E. The job picture in the U.S. 
 The picture in the job market for U.S. chip designers is unclear, but the short-term 
dynamic of expansion overseas with modest growth of domestic design centers gives some cause 
for concern. However past experience in the semiconductor industry serves as a reminder to be 
cautious in extrapolating from the present. 
 During the past five years, the many forces affecting the semiconductor industry include 
the severe recession during 2001, the recovery that stalled in 2004, the large decline in venture 
funding for start-ups that is only beginning to pick up, changes in the number of H1-B visas, and 
a drop in foreign student applications to U.S. graduate engineering schools since 9-11. It is 
difficult to disentangle the effect of the business cycle from any underlying long-run trend in the 
offshoring of design jobs. This caveat should be borne in mind during the following analysis of 
the U.S. labor market for electronics engineers (EEs) using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. 
 Ideal data would be specific to chip design engineers. However this level of occupation 
and industry classification are not available. Instead the data presented here are for EEs in all 
industries over the period 1999-2004 and at EE data in a broadly-defined semiconductor industry. 
 The most detailed level of EE occupational detail  is “Electronics Engineers, Except 
Computer” (occupational classification 17-2072). In addition to chip designers, this category 
includes product-level system designers and engineers who develop non-chip components. 
Within this category, 12% were in the semiconductor industry (NAICS 3344, see below) in 2004. 
Another 13% were in electronics-related industries, and 29% in telecommunications. The rest are 
scattered throughout other industries. According to non-BLS semiconductor industry data for 
2000-2004, 4-10% of EE new graduates go into the semiconductor industry.122
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TABLE 11: Employment and Earnings for U.S. Electronics Engineers, 1999-2004 
 
Total EE 
Employment 
Mean annual EE 
earnings 
Percentage 
change in EE 
employment 
Percentage 
change in total 
nonfarm 
employment 
May 2004 135,560 $77,450 3.29% 0.56% 
Nov.2003 131,240 $74,800 4.14% -0.08% 
2002 126,020 $71,600 2.28% -0.36% 
2001 123,210 $69,710 -0.39% -1.36% 
2000 123,690 $66,490 15.78% 1.94% 
1999 106,830 $63,410 -- -- 
Source: BLS Occupational Employment Statistics web site, www.bls.gov/oes/home.htm, 
accessed April 15, 2005. 
 
 Table 11 shows a relatively strong national demand for electronics engineers. The rapid 
buildup during the telecom and Internet bubble is clearly visible in the 16% growth for 2000, but 
after a small correction in 2001, the level continues rising significantly faster than total nonfarm 
employment. Mean annual earnings continued to rise throughout the period and were 16.5% 
higher in 2004 than in 2000, while the consumer price index for Urban Wage Earners increased 
9.2% over the same period. 
 The BLS industry-specific data, based on the North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS), are also imprecise for our purposes. Employment and wage data are available 
for “Semiconductor and Other Electronic Component Manufacturing” (NAICS four-digit level 
3344), which includes relatively low-value components such as resistors and connectors. The 
most relevant subcategory, “Semiconductor and related device manufacturing” (NAICS 334413), 
accounted for 39% of employees (and 45% of non-production workers) in the 3344 category in 
2003, but occupation-specific data are not available at this level of industry detail.123
 The data in Table 12 from the broadly-defined semiconductor industry for the two 
occupations involved in chip design, electronic engineers and software engineers (applications 
and systems) show a strong, although more variable, labor market for the period 2002-2004, the 
only years publicly available. EEs earn less than the software engineers in the four-digit 
semiconductor industry, and systems software engineers experienced the fastest earnings growth 
during the two-year period. Applications software engineers experienced a dip in employment in 
2004 after strong employment growth in 2003, and EEs experienced a dip in employment in 2003 
followed by very strong employment growth in 2004. This is consistent with the peak in the 
national unemployment rate for electrical and electronics engineers to 6.2% in 2003, as it 
converged for the first time in 30 years with the general unemployment rate, before falling back 
in 2004 to a more typical rate of 2.2%.124
                                                     
123 U.S. Census Bureau, “Statistics for Industry Groups and Industries: 2003”, Annual Survey of Manufactures, April 
2005. 
124 Data were provided by Ron Hira. BLS redefined occupations beginning with the 2000 survey covering 1999, but 
there is no evidence that the redefinition has contributed to the post-bubble unemployment rise. See also “It’s Cold Out 
There”, IEEE Spectrum, July 2003. 
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TABLE 12: Employment and Earnings for U.S. Semiconductor Engineers, 2002-2004 
 
Total 
Employment
Mean Annual 
Earnings 
Percentage 
change in 
employment 
Percentage 
change in 
earnings 
May 2004     
 
SoftwareApplications 
SoftwareSytems 
ElectronicEngineer 
7880 
6070 
16,580 
$83,060 
$90,240 
$78,350 
 
-7.3% 
+7.1% 
+23.0% 
 
+2.6% 
+6.4% 
+3.3% 
May 2003     
 
SoftwareApplications 
SoftwareSytems 
ElectronicEngineer 
8500 
5670 
13,480 
$80,970 
$84,790 
$75,870 
 
+13.9% 
+10.3% 
-1.5% 
 
+2.9% 
+4.6% 
+4.4% 
2002     
SoftwareApplications 
SoftwareSytems 
ElectronicEngineer 
7460 
5140 
13,690 
$78,710 
$81,060 
$72,680 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Source: BLS Occupational Employment Statistics web site, www.bls.gov/oes/home.htm, 
NAICS 334400 occupations 
 
 Based on the available government data, the current wave of expansion of in-house 
offshore design centers and the growth of international design outsourcing does not appear to 
have had a major negative impact on the semiconductor labor market in the U.S. to date, but 
results from a regional survey reveal underlying strains. Silicon Valley, considered the cradle and 
creative font of the semiconductor industry, is experiencing a more difficult job climate. Silicon 
Valley jobs in the semiconductor industry declined 3.6% in 2004 (second quarter) compared to a 
year earlier, although semiconductor earnings, which averaged considerably above the national 
average at $120,000, rose 13.5% in 2003. Overall the number of jobs in the Silicon Valley has 
continued to decrease since 2001.125
 The situation is also more difficult for older engineers, who face rapid skill obsolescence. 
We have heard in our research interviews that chip companies value new graduates, who are 
trained with the newest technology and command lower salaries. The 2004 salary survey by the 
EE Times found almost no difference in engineers’ average salary at 40-44 years old ($104,000) 
versus 55-59 ($105,000).126 Experienced design engineers are often forced to work on mature 
technologies, which pay less. For example, the EE Times survey found that the average annual 
salary for U. S. and European engineers skilled at designing for the latest chip process technology 
was $107,000, whereas engineers designing for the more mature analog technology averaged 
$87,000.127
  Perhaps unsurprisingly, industry participants themselves are split on the significance of 
offshoring for the U.S. job market. A 2004 survey of more than 1,453 chip and board design 
engineers and managers by EE Times shows that about half saw foreign outsourcing as leading to 
a reduction in headcount. Qualitative opinions in the survey were also divided, with optimists 
noting that reduced costs made for a stronger company and a more secure job, while the 
                                                     
125 Joint Venture: Silicon Valley Network, “2005 Index of Silicon Valley,” available online at 
www.jointventure.org/PDF/JVIndex2005_FINAL.pdf. They use state unemployment insurance data, which is the basis 
for the Census data. 
126 “Mean wages edge closer to six-figure mark,” EE Times, August 25, 2004.  
127 “After 10-year surge, salaries level off at $89k,” EE Times, August 28, 2003. 
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pessimists bemoaned downward pressure on wages and employment plus a possible loss of 
intellectual property and, in the long run, industry leadership.128
 We have observed some of the same dynamics of design job movement over the business 
cycle as occurred during the offshoring of assembly. A wave of design offshoring took place at 
the height of the dot.com bubble. When the cascading effect of the subsequent downturn reached 
the semiconductor industry, chip companies cut staff at home. Now that the recovery requires 
expansion of design operations, chip companies appear to be expanding design operations abroad 
faster than at home.129 It is too early to predict where this relative shift in the geographic 
distribution of employment will find a new equilibrium. 
 
V. Synthesis and conclusion 
 This section revisits the lessons from the earlier periods of offshoring of the 
semiconductor value chain in light of what is known so far about the offshoring of design before 
turning to a discussion of policy issues. 
A. Assembly, fabrication, and design compared 
 The first lesson from the experience of assembly offshoring was that a partial move 
offshore to reduce costs can keep the industry competitive while allowing it time to adjust to a 
changing market environment. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the greatest source of anxiety was 
low-cost competition from Asia and a shift in importance from military to consumer electronics 
applications. Today, the offshoring of design is being driven by the rising fixed costs of chip 
design at a time when the industry’s key application market is changing from the corporate 
computing sector to the price-sensitive consumer multimedia market. Offshoring appears to be a 
vital tool for allowing U.S. firms to bring complex chips to market at competitive prices and to 
expand the market for lower-cost chips in the developing countries. 
 A second lesson is that offshoring can lead to hollowing out, which was the case for U.S. 
chip assembly. As the example of Texas Instruments’ 20-year old Indian design subsidiary, the 
work being done offshore will increasingly resemble that being done at home. Some start-ups 
have already adopted a structure featuring minimal high-level design staff in the U.S. with the 
bulk of engineering done in low-cost Asian locations. We expect the phenomenon of these virtual 
chip firms to become more widespread. Nevertheless, most, if not all, vital intellectual property 
will be developed and retained close to headquarters. Furthermore, we expect the large firms who 
employ large design groups in the U.S. to continue to do so. Therefore we do not anticipate a 
hollowing out of chip design comparable to what occurred with chip assembly. 
 The third lesson from the offshoring of assembly is that in-house offshoring can give rise 
to international outsourcing as local suppliers spring up alongside U.S. and other subsidiaries. It 
is far from clear that this will happen in chip design. Many of the founders of foreign start-ups 
have educational and work experience in the U.S. Foreign start-ups also benefit from policy 
interventions, as in China; from the strength of related activity, such as the Indian emergence of 
chip design on the back of the successful software industry; or some combination of the two, as in 
Taiwan. It seems probable that local companies will continue to spin off from U.S. subsidiaries to 
offer design services and reusable functional blocks. For the time being these lower-level design 
activities are mostly complements rather than competitors to U.S. firms. 
 Because design is more central to the firm than was assembly, the diffusion of design 
knowledge through in-house offshoring and international outsourcing might give rise to rivals 
that could ultimately threaten U.S. industry leadership and U.S. design jobs. The prospects vary 
greatly by the institutional environment in each location. As discussed above, Taiwan’s fabless 
                                                     
128 “It's an outsourced world, EEs acknowledge,” EE Times, August 27, 2004. 
129 See, for example, “The perfect storm brews offshore,” Electronic Business, March 2004, accessible at www.reed-
electronics.com/eb-mag/toc/03%2D01%2D2004/ 
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sector, which did not arise as an outgrowth of U.S. design offshoring, is nearly a generation 
behind U.S. rivals in terms of innovative products. For now, local firms in India have generally 
avoided the fabless model, but in China there is a small but increasing number of fabless firms 
targeting world markets. Although for now Chinese firms lack experienced engineers and 
managers and are be behind Taiwan in their development of innovative products, this will 
gradually shift in the years ahead. It is too early to know where this process will end. 
 One of the observations from the offshoring of fabrication was that the offshoring of 
high-end activities in developed countries for market access was partially offset by cross-
investments in the U.S. by European and Japanese firms. As discussed above, this is definitely the 
case for design, with the addition that such cross-investments may also be made in pursuit of 
specialized resources. Even ambitious small firms from relatively low-cost countries such as 
Taiwan are often compelled to invest in a small design center in Silicon Valley to access the 
expert skills available there. This has helped to blunt the effect of the in-house offshoring of chip 
design by U.S. firms. 
 The other lesson from the fabrication experience was that the development of the activity 
in new locations can lead to restructuring of the industry. In the case of fabrication, this meant 
that the emergence of chip foundries in Asia spurred the growth of the U.S.-dominated fabless 
sector. This was a long-term process, and it is too early to be sure if anything of this type will 
happen with design. The phenomenon of virtual chip firms, with most design and other activities 
offshore, may be spreading. This will remain true to the extent that it confers cost advantages 
over fabless rivals. 
B. Policy issues 
 Offshoring appears to be a largely positive phenomenon at the industry level. The 
reduced costs and the flexibility provided by offshore design centers has allowed both new 
entrants and incumbents in the U.S. to maintain their competitive advantage despite the rising 
cost of the typical chip design. The lower costs have translated into growing consumer markets, 
both for advanced products in the developed countries and for scaled-down products in 
developing countries, especially fast-growing Asian markets. U.S. companies have also become 
savvy about how to develop products for regional markets, and often locate design and marketing 
activities accordingly. In addition, U.S. companies have carefully considered what intellectual 
property they must protect and keep close to home for strategic reasons, and what activities can 
be sent offshore, often with new protections in place. 
 The industry’s offshoring has gone well beyond the point where blunt instruments such 
as trade policy can help engineers without harming companies. Taxes or quotas on traded 
activities or goods would raise the cost structure of the many companies who have already 
invested offshore whether they are designing primarily for the foreign or the domestic chip 
market. 
 Policy is thus unlikely to be able to improve the demand side of the labor market, and 
industry has been active in lobbying for changes on the supply side in the form of education and 
immigration changes. The Winter 2005 newsletter of the Semiconductor Industry Association 
includes articles such as “Maintaining Leadership As Global Competition Intensifies” by the 
organization’s president and “America Must Choose To Compete” by the outgoing CEO of Intel. 
One of the main targets of these industry analyses is education. Higher education policies, which 
reflect both university decisions and government funding, determine the number and country of 
origin of engineering graduates at all levels. 
 The importance of foreign nationals in our MS and PhD programs in Electrical 
Engineering has a direct impact on the supply of engineers both in the United States as well as 
China and India. Foreign graduates of U.S. engineering schools must obtain temporary visas, 
usually H1-B visas for up to six years, before they can work in the U.S. after graduation. The 
complex issues relating to immigration and educational policies are controversial and a thorough 
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discussion of them is beyond the scope of this paper. Experts cannot even agree if the U.S. is 
educating too few engineers (and scientists) or is facing an engineer shortage.130
 Government policies regulating immigration, especially the issuance of H1-B (Non-
Immigrant Professional) and L-1 (Intra-Company Transfer) visas, have an important impact on 
the number of foreign engineers engaged in semiconductor work. Changes in the policy appear to 
have had an effect on in-house offshoring. When the number of H1-B visas issued was 
dramatically cut in 2002 and 2003 in response to the recession, many U.S. companies used the 
opportunity to send foreign nationals with U.S. education and experience back to India and China 
to help build operations there. Although the salaries are much lower, the purchasing power parity 
comparisons indicate that engineers still enjoy a high standard of living after returning home. For 
example, the PPP-adjusted salary of a design engineer is $77,300 in India and $69,400 in China, 
compared to $82,000 in the U.S.131 Using data from ‘PhDs…Ten Years Later’ survey, a study of 
foreign-born U.S. PhDs in science and engineering shows the importance of personal values, 
work-related considerations, and formal and personal ties, as opposed to purely economic 
motivation, in the decision to return home.132
 An area of policy that has received less attention is compensation to engineers who are 
harmed by offshoring. Thanks to the offshoring of chip design,  consumers benefit from lower 
prices and new products (although much of that benefit is received outside the United States), but 
some of the short-term cost of the offshoring is borne by engineers in particular companies or 
industry sectors whose companies are restructuring globally. Currently, white-collar workers like 
chip designers don’t qualify for trade-adjustment assistance from the government when their jobs 
are sent abroad. It would make sense to help these workers with retraining and other forms of 
assistance that will keep these highly-skilled individuals productive. 
 Finally, more and better data are needed. As researchers in other industries have noted, 
more labor market data, both for the U.S. and our trading partners, are needed in order to properly 
understand offshoring and its effects. National policies affecting education, labor markets, and 
innovation will continue to be based upon informed speculation. 
 The semiconductor industry is still in the early stages of a complex dynamic process, and 
policy interventions need to be flexible. At this point it is hard to say what the impact of design 
offshoring will be on the competitive position of the U.S. semiconductor industry, how long it 
will take for the economy to adjust, and whether the new equilibrium will be acceptable. What 
happens to the U.S. semiconductor industry and its workers has important consequences for the 
country, including the jobs created and the technology developed. 
 
                                                     
130 See, for example, National Research Council (2000), National Research Council (2001), Freeman (2003), Butz and 
others (2004), and Task Force On The Future Of American Innovation (2005). 
131 This calculation is based on the PPP of .194 for India and .216 for China reported in the Testimony for the IEEE by 
Ron Hira to the Small Business Committee, available at www.cspo.org/products/lectures/061803.pdf. The PPP 
adjustment is applied to the estimated $15,000 salaries for India and China reported in Table 10 of this paper. 
132 Gupta (2005). 
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